Barker v. Wingo

Facts

On July 20, 1958, in Christian County, Kentucky, an elderly couple was beaten to death. Two suspects, Silas Manning and Willie Barker, were arrested shortly thereafter. A grand jury indicted them on September 15, and Barker's trial was set for October 21. The Commonwealth had a stronger case against Manning and believed it could not convict Barker unless Manning testified against him. Manning was unwilling to incriminate himself, so the Commonwealth decided to convict Manning first. On October 23, it obtained the first of 16 continuances (postponements) of Barker's trial. Manning's cases dragged on through six trials, with hung juries and reversals, and his final convictions came in March 1962 and December 1962. Every term thereafter, while the Manning prosecutions were in process, the Commonwealth routinely moved to continue Barker's case to the next term. Barker spent 10 months in jail, then posted a $5,000 bond and stayed free until trial. His counsel did not object to the first 11 continuances. On February 12, 1962, Barker moved to dismiss the indictment, and the court denied it. He did not object to the next two continuances. In 1963 the Commonwealth sought more delay because the ex-sheriff, its chief investigating officer, was ill, and Barker objected. Trial began on October 9, 1963, with Manning as chief witness. Barker was convicted and given a life sentence.

Issues

1. What criteria decide whether a state defendant has been denied the constitutional right to a speedy trial, and must a defendant demand a speedy trial or lose the right for the earlier period?
2. Under those criteria, was Barker, tried more than five years after arrest after 16 continuances, deprived of his right to a speedy trial?

Holding

The Court rejected both inflexible approaches, a fixed time period, which goes further than the Constitution requires, and the demand-waiver rule, and adopted a balancing test. Barker was not deprived of his due process right to a speedy trial. Although the delay was extraordinary, prejudice was minimal and the record strongly indicated that Barker did not want a speedy trial. The Court reserved the possibility of dismissal without an objection in extraordinary circumstances.