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Constitutional LawFree speech

Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire

Supreme Court of the United States · Decided March 9, 1942 · Core case

Full citation

Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).

VerifiedQuotes, pinpoints and citation checked word for word against the opinion; facts checked against the opinion before publication. October 20, 2026.

Chaplinsky

distributor of religious literatureappellant

New Hampshire

state

The parties: Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.

Brief

Facts

Chaplinsky, a member of the sect known as Jehovah's Witnesses, was distributing the literature of his sect on the streets of Rochester, New Hampshire, on a busy Saturday afternoon. Members of the local citizenry complained to City Marshal Bowering that Chaplinsky was denouncing all religion as a racket. Bowering told them Chaplinsky was lawfully engaged, but then warned Chaplinsky that the crowd was getting restless. Later a disturbance occurred. A traffic officer started with Chaplinsky for the police station but did not tell him he was under arrest. On the way they met Bowering, who had been told a riot was under way and was hurrying to the scene. Bowering repeated his warning. Chaplinsky then addressed to Bowering the words set out in the complaint. They called Bowering a God damned racketeer and a damned Fascist, and said the whole government of Rochester were Fascists or agents of Fascists. The state charged him under a New Hampshire law that barred addressing any offensive, derisive or annoying word to another person lawfully in a street or other public place. Chaplinsky told a slightly different story. He testified that he asked Bowering to arrest those responsible for the disturbance, and that Bowering cursed him and told him to come along. He admitted saying the words charged, except the name of the Deity.

Issues

  1. Does a New Hampshire statute, as the state's highest court construed it, violate the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of free speech by punishing offensive words addressed to a person in a public place?
  2. Is the statute so vague and indefinite that a conviction under it denies due process?
  3. Does applying the statute to Chaplinsky's words to Bowering unreasonably impinge on free speech?

Holding

The statute's first provision, on words addressed to another in a public place, as the state court read it to reach only face-to-face words plainly likely to cause a breach of the peace, is narrowly drawn, is not too vague, and does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment on its face or as applied to Chaplinsky's epithets.

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