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Criminal LawHomicide

Commonwealth v. Welansky

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Decided June 5, 1944 · Core case

Full citation

Commonwealth v. Welansky, 55 N.E.2d 902 (Mass. 1944).

Quote pages are pages of 316 Mass. 383, the official report, so quotes and pinpoints cite it; for 55 N.E.2d 902, find the page in that reporter.

VerifiedQuotes, pinpoints and citation checked word for word against the opinion; facts checked against the opinion before publication. October 20, 2026.

Commonwealth

prosecution

Barnett Welansky

nightclub ownerdefendant

The parties: Commonwealth v. Barnett Welansky.

Brief

Facts

New Cocoanut Grove, Inc., a corporation, ran a night club in Boston that offered food, drink and entertainment to the public. Barnett Welansky completely dominated the corporation and its business. He owned all the capital stock, took all the profits, and ran it without regard to corporate forms. It was not shown that he had delegated responsibility for the safety exits to anyone. He usually spent his evenings at the club, superintending the business. On November 16, 1942, he became suddenly ill and went to a hospital, where he stayed until December 11, 1942. His brother and an employee assumed some of his duties but made no change in methods. On the evening of November 28, 1942, the club was crowded with hundreds of patrons. The door at the head of the stairs from the basement Melody Lounge had a panic bar, but it could have been found that the door was regularly locked with a key kept in an office desk. Another door was barred by a clothing rack. The main dining room's panic doors were hidden behind fastened wooden doors, with dining tables placed near them. Two other doors to Shawmut Street were kept locked by his direction. A sixteen-year-old bar boy lighted a match to see a light bulb in an artificial palm tree. Apparently the match ignited the tree and the low cloth ceiling. The fire spread with great speed, and the lights went out. Patrons found exits locked or blocked, and a great number died.

Issues

  1. Can a defendant who owes a duty of care to business visitors be convicted of involuntary manslaughter for deaths caused by an intentional failure to provide safe exits in wanton or reckless disregard of their safety, even if the defendant did not personally cause the fire?
  2. Is the standard for wanton or reckless conduct met when an ordinary normal man in the defendant's circumstances would have realized the gravity of the danger, even if the defendant did not realize it and thought he was careful?

Holding

Where a defendant in control of premises owes a duty of care to business visitors, his intentional failure to take that care, in disregard of the probable harmful consequences to them, can be wanton or reckless conduct, and a death resulting from it is manslaughter. The Commonwealth did not have to prove that Welansky caused the fire, and his absence in the hospital did not excuse conditions that were his usual system. The jury was correctly instructed, and no assigned error required reversal.

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