Katzenbach v. Morgan

Facts

Section 4 (e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, in the respects pertinent here, provides that no person who has successfully completed the sixth primary grade in a public school in, or a private school accredited by, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in which the language of instruction was other than English may be denied the right to vote in any election because of inability to read or write English. New York's laws required an ability to read and write English as a condition of voting. Under those laws, many of the several hundred thousand New York City residents who had migrated there from Puerto Rico had previously been denied the vote. Congress declared that it enacted § 4 (e) "to secure the rights under the fourteenth amendment of persons educated in American-flag schools in which the predominant classroom language was other than English." The appellees were registered voters in New York City. They challenged § 4 (e) insofar as it stopped New York from enforcing its English literacy requirement, because it would let many of these citizens vote. The Court was told that New York's requirement began as an incentive for non-English-speaking immigrants to learn English and as a way to assure an intelligent exercise of the franchise.

Issues

1. Can Congress, acting under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibit enforcement of a state law without a judicial finding that the state law itself violates the Equal Protection Clause?
2. Is § 4 (e), as applied to New York's English literacy requirement, appropriate legislation to enforce the Equal Protection Clause?
3. Does § 4 (e) work an invidious discrimination in violation of the Fifth Amendment because it relieves only those educated in American-flag schools, and not those educated in schools outside the United States?

Holding

In the application challenged, § 4 (e) is appropriate legislation under § 5 to enforce the Equal Protection Clause. Under the Supremacy Clause, New York's English literacy requirement cannot be enforced to the extent it is inconsistent with § 4 (e). The Court held only that the limit on § 4 (e)'s relief is not a forbidden discrimination.