McDougald v. Garber

Facts

On September 7, 1978, Emma McDougald, then 31 years old, underwent a Caesarean section and tubal ligation at New York Infirmary. Garber performed the surgery, and Armengol and Kulkarni provided anesthesia. During the surgery, Mrs. McDougald suffered oxygen deprivation. It caused severe brain damage and left her in a permanent comatose condition. She and her husband, who sued derivatively (his claim depended on hers), alleged that the defendants' malpractice caused the injuries. At trial, the defendants tried to show that her injuries were so severe that she could neither feel pain nor appreciate her condition. The plaintiffs offered proof that she responded to certain stimuli enough to indicate she was aware of her circumstances. Her level of cognitive ability, if any, was sharply disputed. The parties and the trial court agreed she could not recover for pain and suffering unless she was conscious of the pain. The defendants said awareness was also required for loss of enjoyment of life. The trial court instead accepted the plaintiffs' view that this loss was compensable whether or not she knew of it. It told the jury to treat loss of enjoyment of life as an element of nonpecuniary damages (compensation for the physical and emotional consequences of injury) separate from pain and suffering.

Issues

1. Is some degree of cognitive awareness a prerequisite to recovery for loss of enjoyment of life by a person injured by another's negligence?
2. Should a jury be instructed to consider and award damages for loss of enjoyment of life separately from damages for pain and suffering?

Holding

A plaintiff needs "some level of awareness" to recover for loss of enjoyment of life, and a jury should not make a separate award for it apart from pain and suffering. The instructions were wrong on both points, so the Court ordered a new trial on nonpecuniary damages.