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Morissette v. United States

Supreme Court of the United States · Decided January 7, 1952 · Core case

Full citation

Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952).

VerifiedQuotes, pinpoints and citation checked word for word against the opinion; facts checked against the opinion before publication. October 20, 2026.

Morissette

scrap iron collectorpetitioner

United States

governmentrespondent

The parties: Morissette v. United States.

Brief

Facts

The Government set up a practice bombing range on uninhabited, wooded land in Michigan, where the Air Force dropped simulated bombs. Signs warned people to keep out, but the range was extensively hunted for deer. Spent bomb casings were dumped in heaps, some accumulating for four years or upwards and rusting away. In December 1948, Morissette went hunting there, did not get a deer, and salvaged some casings to meet the trip's expenses. Openly, in broad daylight, he loaded three tons onto his truck, flattened them at a nearby farm, and trucked them to market in Flint, where he realized $84. Morissette, a fruit stand operator, trucker and scrap iron collector, was an honorably discharged veteran with a good name among his neighbors. When an investigation began, he candidly told the authorities the whole story: he had no intention of stealing and thought the property was abandoned and unwanted. He was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 641 for unlawfully, wilfully and knowingly stealing and converting government property. At trial, the judge ruled that abandonment was no defense, would not let Morissette show that belief, and refused to let the jury consider whether he acted with innocent intention. He charged that taking the property from government land without permission made Morissette guilty, and ruled that felonious intent was presumed by his own act.

Issues

  1. Does the omission of express mention of criminal intent from a federal statute codifying common-law theft offenses eliminate the requirement of mens rea (an evil purpose or mental culpability) for the offense of knowingly converting government property?
  2. May a trial court determine criminal intent as a matter of law by instructing the jury that the law presumes felonious intent from the mere act of taking property?

Holding

The omission of intent from 18 U.S.C. § 641 did not eliminate the mental element from the offense of knowing conversion, and Morissette was entitled to have the jury decide whether he acted with criminal intent or an honest belief that the bomb casings were abandoned. The trial court committed reversible error by treating criminal intent as a question of law and instructing the jury to presume felonious intent from the mere act of taking.

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