Shelley v. Kraemer

Facts

In 1911, thirty out of thirty-nine property owners on Labadie Avenue in St. Louis signed an agreement restricting occupancy for fifty years to persons of the Caucasian race and excluding people of the Negro or Mongolian race. The restricted district covered fifty-seven parcels of land, and the signing owners held forty-seven parcels, including the parcel in this case. When the agreement was signed, five parcels in the district were owned by Negroes, and one had been occupied by Negro families since 1882. On August 11, 1945, petitioners Shelley, who were Negroes, received a warranty deed to the parcel from one Fitzgerald for valuable consideration. The trial court found that the Shelleys had no actual knowledge of the restrictive agreement when they bought the property. On October 9, 1945, respondents, who owned other property subject to the covenant, sued in the Circuit Court of the city of St. Louis to restrain the Shelleys from taking possession and to divest their title. In a companion case from Detroit, Michigan, property owners executed a contract in 1934 restricting occupancy to Caucasians until January 1, 1960. Petitioners in that case, who were found by the trial court to be Negroes, acquired title by deed on November 30, 1944, and occupied the property. On January 30, 1945, respondents sued in the Wayne County Circuit Court to enforce the restriction.

Issues

1. Does the judicial enforcement by state courts of private agreements that exclude persons of a designated race or color from the ownership or occupancy of real property deny those persons equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment?
2. Does a private restrictive covenant based on race or color violate the Fourteenth Amendment when standing alone and effectuated only by voluntary adherence?

Holding

The state court decrees that barred petitioners from possessing or occupying properties they had purchased from willing sellers, and in the Missouri case divested their title, operated as state action denying them the equal protection of the laws. Because the exclusion was based solely on race or color, the judicial enforcement of the restrictive covenants could not stand, and the judgments were reversed.