Taylor v. Sturgell

Facts

Greg Herrick, an antique aircraft enthusiast, owned an F–45 airplane made by the Fairchild Engine and Airplane Corporation. In 1997 he asked the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), for technical documents about the F–45 in the agency's records. The FAA refused because the documents fell within FOIA's exemption for trade secrets and confidential commercial information. Fairchild, the manufacturer's corporate successor, objected to release. Herrick sued in the District of Wyoming and relied on a 1955 letter in which the manufacturer authorized the agency to lend its documents to the public. He lost. The Tenth Circuit decided his case on July 24, 2002. Less than a month later, on August 22, Brent Taylor, a friend of Herrick's, made a FOIA request for the same documents. When the FAA did not respond, Taylor sued in the District of Columbia. He raised the 1955 letter argument and also two issues Herrick had not raised on appeal. The record showed that Taylor was president of an antique aircraft association to which Herrick belonged, that the two were close associates, that Herrick had asked Taylor to help restore the F–45, that the same lawyer represented both men, and that Herrick apparently gave Taylor documents he had obtained in discovery. The Court stated that there was no evidence that Taylor controlled, financed, participated in, or even had notice of Herrick's suit.

Issues

1. Does federal common law recognize a broad "virtual representation" exception that lets a judgment bind a nonparty who had an identity of interests and a close relationship with a party to the earlier suit?
2. On this record, does the judgment against Herrick bar Taylor's FOIA suit under one of the established grounds for nonparty preclusion, and who bears the burden of proving the agency ground on remand?

Holding

The Court disapproved preclusion by "virtual representation." A federal-question judgment binds a nonparty only on an established ground. On the record as it stood, Herrick's judgment did not bar Taylor, because adequate representation and four other grounds did not apply. The Court remanded to decide whether Taylor is acting as Herrick's agent.