United States v. Morrison

Facts

Christy Brzonkala enrolled at Virginia Polytechnic Institute (Virginia Tech) in the fall of 1994. That September she met Antonio Morrison and James Crawford, two students who played on the school's varsity football team. Brzonkala alleged that within 30 minutes of meeting her, they assaulted and repeatedly raped her. She alleged that the attack left her severely emotionally disturbed and depressed. Shortly afterward she stopped attending classes and withdrew from the university. In early 1995 she filed a complaint under Virginia Tech's Sexual Assault Policy. At the school's hearing, Morrison admitted having sexual contact with her although she had twice told him "no." The school's Judicial Committee found insufficient evidence to punish Crawford, but it found Morrison guilty of sexual assault and suspended him for two semesters. The dean of students upheld that sentence. In July 1995 the school told Brzonkala that Morrison planned to challenge his conviction in court. Officials said a second hearing was needed because the school had erred in using the Sexual Assault Policy, which had not been widely circulated to students. After a second hearing under the school's Abusive Conduct Policy, the Judicial Committee again found Morrison guilty and suspended him for two semesters, but the description of his offense was changed, without explanation, to using abusive language. Morrison appealed, and the provost set his punishment aside as excessive. Virginia Tech did not tell Brzonkala. When she learned from a newspaper that Morrison would return for the fall 1995 semester, she dropped out.

Issues

1. Does the Commerce Clause give Congress power to enact §13981's civil remedy as a regulation of activity that substantially affects interstate commerce, when the remedy reaches gender-motivated crimes of violence wherever they occur?
2. Does §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment give Congress power to enact §13981's civil remedy, which is directed at individuals who commit gender-motivated crimes rather than at any State or state actor?

Holding

Section 13981's civil remedy exceeds Congress's power under the Commerce Clause, because gender-motivated crimes of violence are not economic activity and their aggregate effect on interstate commerce cannot justify the law. It also exceeds Congress's power under §5, because it is directed not at any State or state actor but at individuals who commit gender-motivated crimes, and because it applies nationwide though Congress's findings show the problem does not exist in all States.